Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An employee who had previously worked for the Department of State, and later for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a criminal investigator, was removed from his position by DHS. The removal was based on a charge of lack of candor, relating to allegedly deceptive or incomplete responses he gave during the background investigation process, including failing to disclose an agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office that led to his resignation from State, and omitting details about prior criminal charges and a security clearance suspension. The employee contested the removal, arguing that his omissions were not deceptive and that he had legitimate reasons for his responses.After his removal, the employee filed a "mixed case" complaint with DHS’s Office of Diversity and Civil Rights, alleging both discrimination and non-discrimination grounds for his termination. DHS failed to meet certain regulatory deadlines for handling his complaint. The employee eventually appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), including a motion for sanctions against DHS for missing deadlines. The Board’s administrative judge denied the sanctions request, sustained four of the eleven specifications supporting the lack of candor charge, and upheld the penalty of removal. The full Board split, making the initial decision final and appealable.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, because the employee had formally abandoned his discrimination claims, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of sanctions, as those arguments were based solely on the discrimination aspects of the case. The court affirmed the Board’s findings that four specifications of lack of candor were supported by substantial evidence and that the penalty of removal was reasonable. The court dismissed the appeal as to sanctions for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the Board in all other respects. View "JADUE v. DHS " on Justia Law

Several inventor-advocacy groups challenged the language used on the cover of patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), alleging that it is misleading. Specifically, they contended that the statement granting patent holders the “right to exclude others” is inaccurate following the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., which established that injunctions are no longer automatically granted to patent holders. The plaintiffs, all non-profit organizations supporting inventors, argued that the PTO’s failure to amend this language harms them because they must divert resources to educate their members about the true scope of patent rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case for lack of standing, holding that the plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient risk of future injury resulting from the challenged language. The district court also denied leave to amend the complaint, finding that any amendment would be futile. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the organizations failed to demonstrate organizational standing because their alleged injury—diverting resources to educate members—was foreclosed as a basis for standing by the Supreme Court’s decision in Food & Drug Admin. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not establish associational standing, as they did not identify any member facing a real and immediate threat of future injury from the patent cover language. The court concluded that amendment of the complaint would be futile, as the foundational deficiencies in establishing standing could not be remedied by further allegations. The judgment of the district court was therefore affirmed. View "US INVENTOR, INC. v. SQUIRES " on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including Michael Kelly and several banking entities under his control, alleged that they lost substantial assets following the 2008 financial crisis when the federal government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. The plaintiffs had invested significant portions of their Tier 1 Capital in preferred shares of these government-sponsored enterprises, following government incentives. After the conservatorship was imposed, the value of these shares plummeted, causing regulatory insolvency in the banks and leading to receivership and asset liquidation. The plaintiffs claimed a loss of $19.4 billion in combined assets and asserted claims for breach of contract and an unconstitutional Fifth Amendment taking.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the amended complaint, which was filed thirteen years after the events in question. The plaintiffs argued that their filing deadline was tolled during the pendency of Washington Federal v. United States, a related class action filed in the same court and appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Claims Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 was not tolled by the Washington Federal litigation and was not subject to equitable or class action tolling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the decision, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2501 is a jurisdictional time bar and is not subject to American Pipe tolling or any equitable tolling. As a result, the plaintiffs’ complaint was untimely, and the dismissal by the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. The court did not reach the merits of the claims, as lack of jurisdiction was dispositive. View "KELLY v. US " on Justia Law

Dougherty Electric, Inc. sought a refund from the IRS for fraud penalties and interest it paid in connection with employment tax liabilities arising from a payroll scheme orchestrated by its sole shareholder between 2001 and 2005. After the shareholder pleaded guilty to tax evasion and was ordered by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to pay restitution, the IRS audited Dougherty Electric, assessed employment taxes and fraud penalties, and Dougherty Electric paid over $1.5 million. The deadline for filing a refund claim with the IRS was December 11, 2017.Dougherty Electric submitted a timely letter to the IRS on December 7, 2017, asserting a refund claim based on the theory that penalties and interest could not be assessed on criminal restitution, referencing Klein v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 341 (2017). After the deadline passed, it submitted another letter raising a new theory—that the fraud penalties lacked supervisor approval required by 26 U.S.C. § 6751(b)(1. In 2018, Dougherty Electric submitted formal refund claims and supporting documentation, but the IRS rejected the claims. Dougherty Electric then sued in the United States Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that Dougherty Electric had not timely filed a proper refund claim with the IRS.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that failure to comply with the pre-suit filing requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) did not deprive the Court of Federal Claims of subject-matter jurisdiction but did require dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court found that Dougherty Electric’s timely claim satisfied the statutory requirement regarding the Klein theory, but not as to the supervisor approval theory. The court affirmed dismissal as to the supervisor theory, vacated dismissal as to the Klein theory, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DOUGHERTY ELECTRIC, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

The plaintiff is an advocacy organization focused on labor rights, which submitted several petitions to the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP). These petitions requested CBP to investigate whether cocoa and cocoa products imported from Côte d’Ivoire were produced using forced child labor, in violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The organization provided extensive evidence, including government reports and firsthand accounts, to support its claims. Despite CBP initiating an investigation and corresponding at various points, no enforcement action, such as a Withhold Release Order, was issued. After years without a definitive response, the organization submitted supplemental petitions with new evidence and eventually filed suit, alleging that CBP unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed action on its petitions.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the complaint and granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, specifically finding that the advocacy organization failed to establish organizational standing. The court determined that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a concrete and demonstrable injury to its activities, as required for Article III standing. The plaintiff appealed this decision, arguing that it suffered financial harm and was denied effective tools for pursuing its mission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered the appeal, applying a de novo standard of review to the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the plaintiff had not established a concrete injury sufficient for standing, reasoning that the organization’s expenditure of resources to advocate for government action did not constitute a legally cognizable harm. The court also found that the mere denial of a procedural tool was insufficient to confer standing. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the Court of International Trade for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN " on Justia Law

The case concerns the United States Postal Service’s contract for canine explosive-detection services. The USPS awarded the contract to K2 Solutions, Inc. (“K2”), while Global K9 Protection Group (“Global K9”) and Michael Stapleton Associates, Ltd. were unsuccessful bidders. Global K9 filed a bid protest in the United States Court of Federal Claims, initially challenging the evaluation of its bid but not directly alleging misconduct by K2. K2 received notice of the original complaint and chose not to intervene, believing the government would adequately defend its interests.The Claims Court case evolved when Global K9 filed an amended complaint under seal, adding new allegations that K2 had materially misrepresented its capabilities during the bidding process. Contrary to court rules and the protective order, Global K9 did not file a redacted public version of the amended complaint, and K2 did not receive notice of these new allegations. The Claims Court ultimately found that K2 had made a material misrepresentation and issued an injunction disqualifying K2 from contract performance. After learning of the injunction, K2 moved to intervene, but by then, the USPS had terminated K2’s contract for default, relying in part on the court’s findings.K2 appealed the denial of its motion to intervene. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held the case was not moot because K2’s interests in contesting the misrepresentation finding remained live in separate proceedings. However, the appellate court affirmed the Claims Court’s decision that K2’s motion to intervene was untimely, as K2 could have sought intervention upon learning of the amended complaint’s existence. The Federal Circuit also found that K2 was not a necessary party because it failed to act promptly to protect its interests. The judgment of the Claims Court was affirmed. View "GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION GROUP, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Two pharmaceutical companies developing treatments for achondroplasia, a genetic disorder, became involved in litigation after one company (Ascendis) filed a New Drug Application (NDA) for its product. The other company (BioMarin), holding a relevant patent, filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging patent infringement by Ascendis’s product. Shortly afterward, Ascendis filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking a judgment of non-infringement and arguing that its activities were protected under the statutory “safe harbor” for regulatory approval.More than thirty days after filing its district court complaint, Ascendis moved for an expedited hearing. BioMarin responded by seeking to dismiss or stay the district court action pending the ITC’s investigation. Ascendis voluntarily dismissed its complaint without prejudice and promptly refiled a nearly identical complaint, this time moving for a mandatory stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a)(2), which requires a district court to stay its proceedings if requested within thirty days of the action’s filing or of being named as a respondent in the ITC. BioMarin opposed, contending Ascendis’s request was untimely, and sought a discretionary stay instead.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted BioMarin’s motion for a discretionary stay and denied Ascendis’s motion for a mandatory stay as moot. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that § 1659(a)(2) does not permit a litigant to restart the thirty-day period for a mandatory stay by voluntarily dismissing and refiling a substantially identical action. The court reasoned that the statutory deadline applies to the original action and that allowing refiling would circumvent the statute’s purpose. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "ASCENDIS PHARMA A/S v. BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL INC. " on Justia Law

Three nonprofit organizations filed a nationwide class action against the United States, alleging that the federal judiciary overcharged the public for access to court records through the PACER system. They claimed the government used PACER fees not only to fund the system itself but also for unrelated expenses, contrary to the statutory limits set by the E-Government Act. The plaintiffs sought refunds for allegedly excessive fees collected between 2010 and 2018.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia oversaw extensive litigation, including class certification and an interlocutory appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously affirmed that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act and that the government had used PACER fees for unauthorized expenses. After remand, the parties reached a settlement totaling $125 million. The district court approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also approved attorneys’ fees, administrative costs, and incentive awards to the class representatives. An objector, Eric Isaacson, challenged the district court’s jurisdiction, the fairness of the settlement, the attorneys’ fees, and the incentive awards.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act because each PACER transaction constituted a separate claim, none exceeding the $10,000 jurisdictional limit. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in approving the class settlement, the attorneys’ fees, or the incentive awards. The court also held that incentive awards are not categorically prohibited and are permissible if reasonable, joining the majority of federal circuits on this issue. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "NVLSP v. US " on Justia Law

In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. View "In re United States" on Justia Law